Discerning Justice When Battered Women Kill by Faigman, David L.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 39 | Issue 1 Article 5
11-1987
Discerning Justice When Battered Women Kill
David L. Faigman
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation





BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION. By Charles Patrick Ewing.t Lexington, Massa-
chusetts: Lexington Books, 1987. Pp. viii, 175. $24.95.
Reviewed by DAVID L. FAIGMAN*
With his book Battered Women Who Kill, Professor Charles Ewing
adds a new view to the already effervescent literature debating the proper
legal response to women who, after years of suffering abuse, kill their
abusers.' Typically, battered women defendants claim self-defense, even
though the killings frequently occur under circumstances that do not fit
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this Review.
1. A truly prolific literature has arisen over the last ten years dedicated to the considera-
ble problem of battered women. For a representative sample, see R. GELLES & C. CORNELL,
INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 63-81 (1985); M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ,
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1980); Crocker, The Mean-
ing of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
121 (1985); Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense,
15 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REv. 623 (1980) [hereinafter Schneider, EqualRights]; Note, Defense
Strategies for Battered Women Who Assault Their Mates: State v. Curry, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 161 (1981); Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 895 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Wife's Dilemma]; Note, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-
Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REv. 615 (1982) [hereinafter
Note, Imperfect Self-Defense]; Recent Developments, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed
4pproach to the Use of Battered Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 VAND. L. REv. 741
(1981). For a more comprehensive list of articles and commentary in this area, see Schneider,
Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony
on Battering 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 196 n.5 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, Expert
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the classical self-defense paradigm.2 In many cases, battered women use
deadly force on their abusers in apparent disproportion to any immedi-
ate threat, or when no apparent immediate threat is present. Yet, upon
reading descriptions of the circumstances of these cases, the killings often
appear justified or, at least, excusable.3 Nonetheless, the doctrine ex-
cludes these women defendants from its restricted scope. Ewing argues
that the severe circumstances of violent relationships pose a dire physical
and psychological threat to women that may justify their killing their
mates. Battered Women Who Kill undertakes the formidable task of re-
shaping self-defense doctrine in order to bring it into conformity with
this belief.
Reformers who write about battered women who kill face a sizeable
challenge: how to reconceptualize the contours of self-defense doctrine
to encompass the situation of the battered woman defendant without
stretching the doctrine beyond recognition. At the present time, the
dominant strategy is to try to avoid this problem entirely by showing
how the situation of the battered woman who kills really does fit into the
traditional self-defense framework. Proponents of this strategy usually
proffer expert testimony on the "battered woman syndrome" to support
a defendant's claim that she reasonably feared imminent serious harm or
death on the occasion in question.4 Ewing rejects the use of battered
Testimony]. On the problem of domestic violence generally, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AT-
TORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT (1984).
2. Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response
to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 149, 153-59 (1978); Comment, The
Battered Wife Syndrome: A Potential Defense to a Homicide Charge, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
213, 221-23 (1978).
3. Professor Fletcher has explained the distinction between justification and excuse as
follows: "A justification speaks to the rightness of the act; an excuse, to whether the actor is
accountable for a concededly wrongful act." G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
759 (1978). The line between justification and excuse in the law of self-defense is not a very
clear one, however. See Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 956
n.37-38 (1985) (discussing difference in self defense as justification and as excuse); Greenawalt,
The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1927 (1984)
("[T]he central distinction between justification and excuse is between warranted action and
unwarranted action for which the actor is not to blame."). The issue whether battered women
who kill and claim self-defense do so as an excuse or as a justification has been the subject of
some comment. See Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting A Historical Accident On
Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 11, 45-55 (1986) (arguing that self-
defense developed originally as an "excuse" rather than as a justification, and that the "bat-
tered women defense" is more consistent with this traditional use); Comment, The Defense of
Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 427, 439-44 (1987) (finding the battered wo-
man syndrome to be consistent with a defense of temporary insanity). As the title of his book
indicates, Ewing firmly believes justification rather than excuse forms the foundation of bat-
tered women defendants' claims of self-defense. It may be that most battered women who kill
in self-defense should be in part justified and in part excused for their action. See infra note 64,
and accompanying text.
4. The theory of "battered woman syndrome" is based on the clinical research of Lenore
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woman syndrome evidence, principally because he does not believe it is
sufficiently effective (pp. 55-56) and proposes an altogether different
scheme for evaluating battered women defendants' claims of self-defense.
Ewing posits a truly novel, and some will find unrealistic, solution to the
problem of battered women who kill. He advances what he calls "psy-
chological self-defense" in his stated effort to enable more battered wo-
men defendants to gain acquittals (pp. 78-79). In so doing, he attempts a
fundamental reconceptualization of self-defense by reinterpreting the im-
minence and proportionality requirements of existing self-defense doc-
trine. His attempt, and ultimately his failure, to develop a viable
alternative tells us much about the conceptual and practical difficulty of
defending battered women who kill.
This Review begins in the same fashion that Ewing and many other
writers in this area begin, with a discussion of the circumstances that lead
some battered women to kill. Rather than select a case study as Ewing
does, however, I attempt to juxtapose the "typical pattern" reportedly
found in these cases with existing self-defense doctrine in an effort to
explore the values inherent in the justified use of deadly force in self-
defense. Ewing argues, and most commentators who have considered the
question agree, that existing self-defense doctrine does not adequately
comprehend the situation of battered women who kill in self- defense. In
part II, I consider the current generally accepted solution to this prob-
lem-the battered woman syndrome-and Ewing's reasons for disfavor-
ing it. In part III, I outline and comment upon Ewing's proposed
alternative of "psychological self-defense." Invoking several psychoana-
lytic principles, Ewing posits that women subjected to, and threatened
with, repeated physical abuse that never poses an imminent serious or
deadly physical harm may be justified in using deadly force to avert the
"extremely serious psychological injury" threatened by the abuse. In the
final section, I review briefly the scientific basis for Ewing's ideas and
then return to the issue introduced in the first section regarding the un-
derlying justification for the action of battered women who kill.
Walker and her colleagues. See L. WALKER, THE BAT=ERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984)
[hereinafter L. WALKER (1984)]; L. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter L.
WALKER (1979)]; Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7
VT. L. REv. 1 (1982); Walker, Battered Women, Psychology, and Public Policy, 39 AM. PsY-
CHOLOGIST 1178 (1984) [hereinafter Walker, Battered Women]. Most courts and commenta-
tors addressing the issue of battered women who kill embrace enthusiastically the theory. See,
e.g., State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); Smith v. State, 237 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678
(1981); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); Buda & Butler, The Battered
Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAM. L. 359 (1984-85); Com-
ment, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial 20 CAL. W.L. REv. 485 (1984);
Note, A Woman, A Horse, and a Hickory Tree: The Development of Expert Testimony on the
Battered Woman Syndrome in Homicide Cases, 53 UMKC L. REv. 386, 397-410 (1985); Re-
cent Developments, supra note 1. More recently, however, the syndrome theory has been
subjected to increased scrutiny. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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I. Traditional Self-Defense and Battered Women Who Kill:
The Common Ground
The doctrine of self-defense embodies much of the American my-
thology of rugged individualism.5 Indeed, the four elements of self-de-
fense doctrine6 very well could have been lifted from the script of a John
Ford Western. 7 The Noble western figure walking down the dusty street
shoots down the outlaw only if he himself faces imminent danger" of the
same fate. Surely no valorous cowboy draws when not confronted by the
first element of self-defense, imminent harm. Similarly, the second ele-
ment of self-defense is met since no self-respecting (i.e., reasonable)
movie hero would use a gun when the outlaw is unarmed; a fair fight
requires a proportional response.9 The third element of self-defense is
easily satisfied by the movie hero, since, by definition, he is never the
aggressor.10 The final element, however, the duty to retreat,"1 presents
some difficulty. Western heros rarely retreat, most often going out of
their way to face outlaws' threats. But even this element ultimately does
not interfere with our believing that the Western hero was justified in
killing. Often the hero refrains from fighting until the end of the picture;
and by this time, like the proverbial wall to which the reasonable man
should retreat, 12 the audience expects nothing less than that the hero
"defend" what is right.
The battered woman, it seems, is far removed from the Western
5. See generally Crocker, supra note 1, at 126 (demonstrating sex bias in the self-defense
reasonable man standard); Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 1, at 636 (same).
6. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 53, at 391 (1972).
7. In describing the typical western movie gunfighter who kills in "self-defense," I do
not assert that these fictitious figures act reasonably or would be acquitted under existing self-
defense doctrine if prosecuted; nor do I intend to vouch for the historical accuracy of the films
that depict the life and times of these heralded individuals. In fact, few Westerns are, or
attempt to be, historically accurate. See J. TUSKA, THE AMERICAN WEST IN FILM: CRITICAL
APPROACHES TO THE WESTERN 3-15 (1985) (criticizing representative sample of western films
for historical inaccuracies); WESTERN MOVIES (W.T. Pilkington & D. Graham, eds. 1979)
(collection of essays discussing the western film as classical myth). Also, the prosecutability of
real western gunfighters in those times of lawlessness surely is a more complex question than I
describe. My only purpose in using the Western as a metaphor of the battered woman's plight
is the "myth" that they portray, and in particular, with the perception of what actions may be
viewed as necessary or reasonable to defend oneself. See Graham, High Noon (1952), in WEST-
ERN MOVIES, supra, at 52 ("if one is going to appreciate rather than dogmatize about Wes-
terns [one must] realize that they are about ideas of the past (and present), rather than
accurate reproductions of the past").
8. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra, note 6 § 53, at 391 (1972) (explaining the elements
of self-defense doctrine).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 394-95.
11. Id. at 395.
12. See Comment, Dwelling Defense Law in Missouri: In Search of Castles, 50 UMKC L.
REV. 64, 66 (1981); see also infra note 55 and accompanying text.
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hero who not only avoids prosecution at the film's conclusion, but is ap-
plauded by the townsfolk, if not the audience, as he rides into the sunset.
But in reality, how different are battered women who kill from the West-
ern movie stereotype? Western movies, after all, in many ways reflect the
values that most people would consider important to a determination of
when the use of force is justified. In fact, most authors sympathetic to
battered women who kill, and Professor Ewing follows suit, describe in
detail the many different contexts in which intimate violence results in
the death of the abuser (pp. 99-142).13 The purpose for including these
descriptions obviously lies in the belief that, if viewed in proper context,
battered women who kill will be seen to have acted reasonably and justifi-
ably. The battered woman's story may be more complex than the con-
trived plots of most movie Westerns, but the reasonableness of her killing
still depends on basic precepts of what is just.
According to the one hundred cases Ewing summarizes in the ap-
pendix to his book, the "typical" battered woman who kills has suffered
years of severe abuse at the hands of her husband or "lover" before she
responds with the fatal blow.14 The battered woman may have sought
outside help, but was frustrated by the police's or community's inade-
quate response to the situation.' 5 The woman may have tried to leave,
but was forced to stay, perhaps by threats of further abuse.' 6 In some
cases the battered woman may have been physically barred from leaving
or physically forced to return (p. 117); in still other cases, the woman
may have been economically dependent on the batterer, or may have had
no family or friends in the area to which to turn for help. 17
13. See L. WALKER (1979), supra note 4, at 80.
14. See, eg., Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1984) (defendant claimed to have
been beaten by her common-law husband throughout her 10-year relationship with him);
Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981) (defendant claimed to have suffered beat-
ings for the six years that she dated and lived with victim).
15. See generally L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 41 (1981) (empirical evaluation of criminal justice response to
wife assault); Dutton, The Criminal Justice Response to WifeAssault, 11 L. & HUM. BEH. 189
(1987) (same); Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals for
Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 74 (1983) (discussing police guidelines for intervention in
domestic violence).
16. See, eg., Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565, 593 (Tex. 1985) (batterer told wife "there
wasn't anything or any place on this earth" that she could ever go where he wouldn't find her);
State v. Smith, 247 Ga. 612, 613, 277 S.E.2d 678, 679 (1981) (defendant stated that she "was
scared to quit seeing the victim because he threatened her").
17. Research conducted by Professors Kalmuss and Straus indicates:
The primary group of women who tolerate severe violence are those highest in
objective dependency [Le., economic dependency]. For such women it is not a ques-
tion of necessary motivation to overcome the obstacles keeping them in abusive mar-
riages, because, in a sense, the obstacles for them are insurmountable. They have
virtually no alternatives to their marriages and, therefore, "must" tolerate the condi-
tions of those marriages.
Kalmuss & Straus, Wife's Marital Dependency and Wife Abuse, 44 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 277,
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Confronted with escalating abuse, and with no way out, battered
women sometimes resort to self-help. But often the battered woman does
not confront the batterer on his own terms, unlike the Western hero who
draws only when drawn upon. Instead, the battered woman anticipates
the abuse she knows too well, and responds before the potentially fatal
blow is raised; or she responds after an abusive incident, in order to stave
off a recurrence which might result in her death. In addition, the wo-
man, often smaller and not socialized into the male "art" of violence, 18
uses a gun or a knife when the batterer approaches unarmed. The bat-
tered woman does not wait for the abuse to begin and uses a weapon
when not threatened with a weapon because she cannot defend herself at
another time, or in another way. The woman's lethal action does not fit
within the narrow confines of self-defense doctrine, nonetheless it ap-
pears justified because under the circumstances it was a reasonable and
warranted response for which she cannot be blamed.
The central message of Ewing's book is that the existing doctrine of
self-defense frustrates any straightforward application of this intuitive
"sense of justice" to battered women who kill. Throughout the book he
rejects the mechanical application of the four elements of the existing
doctrine because it prevents any complete understanding of the battered
woman's situation. He also criticizes battered woman syndrome advo-
cates for failing to explain the "reasonableness" of the woman's action,
that is, for failing to challenge self-defense doctrine directly. In contrast,
Ewing purports to recast the doctrine itself, to bring it into line with
what he considers justifiable lethal responses to continued abuse.
Instead of relying on the fact-finder's intuition or common sense
that battered women may sometimes be justified in killing their abusers,
Ewing constructs a complicated psychological explanation for their ac-
tions. Unfortunately, this psychological approach mirrors the approach
of the battered woman syndrome theorists whom he criticizes, in that he
shrinks from confronting the doctrine squarely. Ewing skirts serious ex-
ploration of the "justness" of the battered woman defendant's conduct by
substituting a psychoanalytic proxy for this analysis. Courts, however,
tend to view such psychological theorizing as creating exemptions from
the existing rule rather than, as they should, challenges to the rule itself.
They are viewed as "battered women defenses."' 19 Certainly, there are
284-85 (1982); see also Strube & Barbour, The Decision to Leave an Abusive Relationship: Eco-
nomic Dependence and Psychological Commitment, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 785 (1983) (con-
cluding that economic dependence contributes significantly to a woman's decision to remain in
an abusive relationship).
18. See MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REV. 703, 732 (1982)
("Women thus perceive the need and do need to resort to deadly force, [and] are more
threatened than a similarly situated man, largely because they are less able to care for them-
selves than they would be if they were trained the way men are trained.").
19. Ewing rejects the notion that there should be a separate "battered woman defense"
[Vol. 39
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practical reasons for shying away from frontal attacks on current doc-
trine; but until advocates for battered women defendants confront the
self-defense doctrine directly, their line of defense will remain flawed.
II. "Exempting" Battered Women From
the Rule of Self-Defense
The simple elegance of traditional self-defense doctrine, and the rea-
son why courts fear giving it up, lie in its ability to discriminate between
cases. It is a foothold on a slope as slippery as they come in the law.
Yet the simplicity of the traditional self-defense doctrine is its fatal flaw.
The doctrine paints reality in broad and distorted strokes. Few cases
truly fit the narrow confines of the doctrine, but many more fit its under-
lying policy. Yet courts can not help but recognize the injustice of the
doctrine as it sometimes is applied. In order to mend constant rifts in the
paradigm, courts have resorted to stop-gap measures or narrowly drawn
exemptions instead of dealing with the breaches themselves. Such meas-
ures can only be short-term solutions, however, for while they may ap-
pease certain groups, they do not address the problem at its core.
By far the most preferred exemption from the strict application of
self-defense doctrine in cases where women kill their abusers is Lenore
Walker's clinical research on the "battered woman syndrome." 20 As the
many articles and books on this topic demonstrate, no one can discuss
the plight of battered women without giving some consideration to this
research (pp. 51-60). Walker's theory consists of basically two parts. The
core of her work lies in what she terms the cycle theory of violence.21
She believes abusive relationships develop a fixed pattern or cycle: The
abuse begins with a phase of increasing tension, which erupts into a se-
vere battering incident, which, in turn, is followed by the abuser's apolo-
(p. 78). By describing the defense only in relation to battered women, and by employing tech-
nical-sounding clinical terminology, however, he runs the risk of being viewed as creating the
same kind of single-purpose defense as battered women syndrome theorists sometimes are mis-
takenly thought to have done. Compare Vaughn & Moore, The Battered Spouse Defense in
Kentucky, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 399, 399 (1983) ("The defense of battered women who kill their
mates is slowly developing a distinct style or technique called the abused spouse defense. This
defense emerges as akin to, but separate from, the more familiar and established defenses of
self-defense and diminished capacity.") with Comment, supra note 4, at 495 ("The battered
woman syndrome is not in or of itself a defense. The defense which is asserted is self-defense,
not that the woman was a battered woman.").
20. See supra note 4.
21. See Gates, Book Review, 8 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 301, 302 (1979) (review-
ing L. WALKER (1979), supra note 4) ("The most original and legally significant of Walker's
ideas is what she calls the 'cycle of violence' between two people."). For Walker's description
of the cycle theory, see L. WALKER (1984), supra note 4, at 95-104; L. WALKER (1979), supra
note 4, at 55-70.
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gies and promises that it will not happen again.22 Despite the abuser's
"loving contrition" expressed during the third phase, the abuse eventu-
ally recurs in the same cyclical fashion. Because the abuse takes on an
identifiable pattern, the abused woman becomes able to predict severe
battering incidents.23 Consequently, the woman comes to "constantly
fear" imminent harm, since the extreme violence of the second phase is
predictable and inevitable.
24
The theory of "learned helplessness" comprises the second compo-
nent of Walker's syndrome theory.25 Borrowing from Martin Seligman's
experimental research, 26 Walker hypothesizes that women subjected to
prolonged abuse come to learn that they are helpless to control the vio-
lence and become depressed and withdrawn to their fate.27 This learned
helplessness, she believes, explains why some women do not flee the long-
standing violent relationship.
28
Ewing observes that while most courts accept the admissibility of
battered woman syndrome testimony, this evidence does not appear to be
very helpful in gaining acquittals. Ewing found that out of the 100 cases
he surveyed, experts testified to the syndrome in twenty-six cases; but
that out of these twenty-six cases, seventeen resulted in the battered wo-
man defendant being convicted of murder, manslaughter, or reckless
homicide (p. 55). From this, Ewing surmises that this evidence "has not
proved to be a legal panacea for battered women who kill their batterers
and claim self-defense" (p. 55). The failing of this research, Ewing as-
serts, is its inability to offer an "explanation of the reasonableness of the
woman's ultimate homicidal act" (p. 55).29
22. L. WALKER (1984), supra note 4, at 95-96; L. WALKER (1979), supra note 4, at 55-
70.
23. See Note, Wife's Dilemma, supra note 1, at 928.
24. See Case Comment, Battered Wives Who Kill: Double Standard Out of Court, Single
Standard In?, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133, 156-60 (1978); Buda & Butler, supra note 4, at
375.
25. See L. WALKER (1984), supra note 4, at 86.
26. In a seminal set of studies, Seligman and his colleagues subjected laboratory dogs to
electrical shocks from which they could not escape. After initial attempts at escape proved
futile, the dogs grew more passive as they "learned" they were "helpless." Subsequently, the
experimenters placed these "learned helpless" dogs into a situation from which other dogs that
had not received the earlier training readily escaped. The learned helpless dogs, however,
generally failed to escape from the new escapable situation. See Seligman, Maler & Greer,
Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 256 (1968).
27. Applying the concept of learned helplesness to battered women, Walker explained
that "the women's experiences... of their attempts to control the violence would, over time,
produce learned helplessness and depression as the 'repeated batterings, like electrical shocks,
diminish the woman's motivation to respond.'" L. WALKER (1984), supra note 4, at 87 (quot-
ing L. WALKER (1979), supra note 4, at 49).
28. L. WALKER (1984), supra note 4, at 86.
29. Professor Schneider has registered a similar criticism, stating that "[t]he critical de-
fense problem in representing battered women who kill and assert self-defense is how to ex-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
The syndrome theory, as Ewing appreciates, smoothly glosses over
its inability to specify what provokes the "ultimate homicidal act." Ac-
cording to the theory, the woman defends herself against the abuse that is
sure to come. The "reasonableness" of this action comes from the cycli-
cal nature of the violence.30 The regularity of the abuse causes the bat-
tered woman to constantly fear for her life. 31 While adopting the
proposition that "constant fear" justifies self-defensive action at any time
eliminates a major obstacle in the imminence requirement, the justness of
a battered woman's homicidal action remains obscure.32 Moreover, the
theory's characterization of battered women as passive and "learned
helpless" further obfuscates why some battered women kill. Syndrome
theorists' use of learned helplessness creates a dilemma for the battered
woman who kills and claims self-defense: "[FMrom a theoretical perspec-
tive one would predict that if battered women suffered from learned help-
lessness they would not assert control over their environment; certainly,
one would not predict such a positive assertion of control as killing the
batterer."
33
Notwithstanding the syndrome theory's apparent failure to shed
light on the reasonableness of the woman's action, it has been over-
whelmingly endorsed by the legal community.34 Part of the reason for
this fact comes from its adoption of the very framework-classical self-
defense doctrine-for which it is intended to be used. It is no coinci-
dence that the theory fully parallels the defense. Indeed, the very genius
of the syndrome theory lies in its avoidance of any reconceptualization of
self-defense doctrine: Courts need not reject the doctrine to admit expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome. Recently, however, com-
mentators have begun to question the validity as well as the wisdom of
plain the woman's action as reasonable." Schneider, Expert Testimony, supra note 1, at 199.
The battered woman syndrome conveys the "context" in which the woman acted, but not the
reason for it. Id.; see also Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and
Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. Rlv. 619, 646 (1986) (authored by David L. Faigman) ("some
explanation may be needed where a woman who has endured years of abuse suddenly strikes
out in apparent revenge or with little provocation; the defense must show what triggered the
deadly attack").
30. See, eg., Buda & Butler, supra note 4, at 375 ("A battered wife's perception of the
imminence of... danger may reasonably encompass every moment in the presence of her
frequently violent husband.").
31. Walker, Battered Women, supra note 4, at 1179 ("Self-defense laws... require the
perception of danger to be imminent and have not recognized the reasonableness of prediction
of imminence based on a history of repeated violence.").
32. Of course, if the abuse follows an identifiable pattern, this fact is highly relevant to
the battered woman's defense. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. Although battered
woman syndrome theory's use of the concept of a "cycle of violence" appears to make this
evidence relevant for the same reasons, the actual research on the cycle theory does not sup-
port this inference. See Note, supra note 29, at 636-40.
33. Note, supra note 29, at 641.
34. See id. at 619.
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employing battered woman syndrome theory to defend battered women
who kill.
First, as I have elaborated elsewhere,35 the research data do not sup-
port the conclusions of the researchers, or the theory's erstwhile advo-
cates. Walker's empirical validation of her cycle and learned helplessness
theories suffers from innumerable logical and methodological errors.
36
Walker's conclusions do not follow from the research methodology she
employed and receive no support from the data she reports. 37 No more
than informed conjecture, Walker's conclusions have little probative
force; and any value they may have is significantly outweighed by the
danger of jury misuse or confusion.
38
More important than the empirical failings, perhaps, is the severe
criticism the theory has drawn for characterizing abused women as help-
less and incapacitated. Professor Elizabeth Schneider, for example, ar-
gues that expert testimony on battered woman syndrome depicts
"battered women as helpless victims and fail[s] to describe the complex-
ity and reasonableness of why battered women act."' 39 Schneider finds
that these expert opinions are reflected in court opinions on " 'battered
woman syndrome' that resonate with familiar stereotypes of female inca-
pacity."' 4 For Schneider, the defect lies in the doctrine of self-defense
itself and its inherent sexual bias.41 Specifically, she objects to the tradi-
tional doctrine's stereotyped view that the only reasonable use of deadly
force comes in response to an imminent serious or deadly attack. As
discussed above, this predominantly male perspective of self-defense does
not take into account alternative, but still reasonable, responses to seri-
ous physical threats that women sometimes must use. In the long run,
Schneider believes, using battered woman syndrome evidence simply sub-
stitutes one stereotype for another and does not promote the enlightened
path the law should be following in this area.
Although Ewing agrees that syndrome evidence tends to stereotype
battered woman defendants, he does not blame the theory for this result.
Syndrome evidence only appears to depict aspects of the battered wo-
35. Id.
36. See id. at 636-43.
37. Id.
38. Because Walker's "cycle of violence" and "learned helplessness" theories have not
been demonstrated to be valid or reliable, expert testimony on these matters is irrelevant to the
courtroom defense of battered women. See generally Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Sci-
entific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1235
(1980) ("The probative value of scientific evidence.., is connected inextricably to its reliabil-
ity; if the technique is not reliable, evidence derived from the technique is not relevant.").
39. Schneider, Expert Testimony, supra note 1, at 199.
40. Id.
41. Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 1, at 636; see also Crocker, supra note 1, at 144
("under [the reasonable] man standard, the defendant must explain why her act of self-defense
does not resemble a man's").
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man's behavior as unreasonable because the doctrine is conceived too
narrowly. Too narrowly, however, not because it contemplates only the
events immediately preceding a woman's homicidal act, but because of
its "equal consequences" requirement (p. 59). Ewing categorically re-
jects the existing doctrine's insistence that victims await the raising of the
deadly blow, and that even then they may only respond in kind. But
Ewing goes much further. He argues that a battered woman's use of
deadly force may be reasonable even though she did not anticipate any
"deadly" attack (p. 59).
11. Physical Abuse and Psychological Harm
Ewing seeks to correct the narrowness of existing self-defense doc-
trine by rejecting the existing doctrine's "eye for an eye and tooth for a
tooth" reasoning. For Ewing there are consequences of battering rela-
tionships as bad or worse than death that may justify killing. The word
"self" in self-defense takes on an expanded meaning under his view:
"[T]here is more to 'self' than mere physical being or bodily integrity"
(p. 62). He states the crux of his argument in the following passage:
As commonly understood outside the law, "self" encompasses
not only the physical aspects of being but also those psychological
functions, attributes, processes, and dimensions of experience that give
meaning and value to physical existence. If "self" is viewed from this
broader and more commonly accepted perspective, it would seem that
many, perhaps even most, battered women who kill their batterers do
so in self-defense. They kill to prevent their batterers from seriously
damaging, if not destroying, psychological aspects of the self which
give meaning and value to their lives. In short, they kill in psychologi-
cal self-defense
(p. 62).
Ewing contemplates an expansion of the meanings of both "self"
and "defense," thereby effectively removing the main obstacles to bat-
tered women defendants' claims of self-defense: the proportionality and
imminence requirements. The imminence requirement has been under
attack for some time, especially by advocates of the battered woman syn-
drome.42 But some courts also have frowned upon too strict an applica-
tion of imminence, finding that smaller and weaker women defendants
should not be condemned for defending themselves at their only opportu-
nity.43 The unique element of Ewing's proposal comes from his repudia-
42. See, eg., Comment, supra note 4, at 493-94 ("Although she may not be receiving an
actual physical attack at the time [of her self-defensive action], she nevertheless believes that
her life is in imminent danger."); Note, Wife's Dilemma, supra note 1, at 929 ("[I]t makes little
sense for the law to excuse the wife's killing if it occurs while she is being beaten, but to find
her guilty of murder if she kills during a temporary respite between beatings.").
43. See, eg., State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240, 559 P.2d 548, 59 (1977). In a case
not involving a battered woman, the Wanrow court found the individual circumstances of the
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tion of the proportionality requirement. He rejects the use of the
prospect of serious "physical harm" or "physical death" as the only ra-
tionale supporting the defensive use of deadly force. Battered women, he
believes, and presumably all victims similarly situated,44 may act reason-
ably if they use deadly force to avert "extremely serious psychological
injury" 45 or, in other words, "psychological death." Ewing constructs
his theory of psychological self-defense from principles articulated in the
disciplines of self psychology, psychopathology, victimology, and the
psychology of terrorism.
Ewing places particular emphasis on the existential philosophies of
R. D. Laing and Heinz Kohut (pp. 63-66). He believes the abuse the
battered woman suffers creates the threat of a psychological condition
Laing described as "ontological insecurity."'46 The "ontologically inse-
cure person," according to Laing, "may feel more unreal than real; in a
literal sense, more dead than alive; precariously differentiated from the
rest of the world, so that his identity and autonomy are always in ques-
tion."47 Kohut traces a parallel course of thought with his notion of
"disintegration anxiety," which he describes as "an intense and pervasive
anxiety [t]he core [of which] is the anticipation of the breakup of the
self."' 48 The symptoms of disintegration anxiety include "severe frag-
defendant to be "entirely proper, and in fact essential, to a proper disposition of the claim of
self defense." Id. at 235, 559 P.2d at 556. Of particular relevance was Wanrow's knowledge of
the victim's history of violence. In addition, the court believed her size and physical disability
had to be considered when evaluating the reasonableness of her response to the situation. In
short, the court called for the jury to " 'stand as nearly as practicable in the shoes of the
defendant, and from this point of view determine the character of the act.'" Id. (quoting State
v. Ellis, 30 Wash. 369, 373, 70 P. 963, 964-65 (1902)). The implications of the Wanrow opin-
ion for battered women defendants have been the subject of much commentary. See Schneider,
The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 589, 606-10 (1986); Schneider, Equal Rights, supra note 1, at 641-42; Schneider & Jor-
dan, supra note 2, at 156-58; Note, Women's Self-Defense Under Washington Law-State v.
Wanrow, 54 WASH. L. REV. 221 (1978).
44. Ewing recognizes that his proposal would provide a defense to other defendants and
cites battered children who kill their battering parents as one possible example (p. 79). But are
the psychological consequences of battering different for adults than for children? Unfortu-
nately, he does not answer this question, or otherwise address the many other issues raised by
the prospect of applying psychological self-defense to other populations.
45. Ewing defines "extremely serious psychological injury" as "gross and enduring im-
pairment of one's psychological functioning which significantly limits the meaning and value
of one's physical existence" (p. 79).
46. R.D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF 39-43 (1970); see C. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED
THERAPY: ITS CURRENT PRACTICE, IMPLICATIONS AND THEORY 510-17 (1951); C. ROGERS,
ON BECOMING A PERSON 184-96 (1961); see generally EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY (R. May
ed. 1969) (discussing existential definitions of "self").
47. R.D. LAING, supra note 46, at 42.
48. H. KOHUT, THE RESTORATION OF THE SELF 104 (1977); see generally REFLECTIONS
ON SELF PSYCHOLOGY (J. Lichtenberg & S. Kaplan eds. 1983) (defining "self" and related
psychological theses); 1 PROGRESS IN SELF PSYCHOLOGY (A. Goldberg ed. 1985) (same).
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mentation, serious loss of initiative, profound drop in self-esteem, [and a]
sense of utter meaningless[ness]." 49
Ewing also draws upon the work of researchers studying crime vic-
tims (i.e., victimologists) and terrorism to try to better grasp the threat
confronting battered women (pp. 70- 75). In particular, he cites the work
of Symonds, a psychiatrist, who identified three phases "all" victims ex-
perience during and after a crime of violence.50 During the crime, vic-
tims "initially respond with shock and disbelief," which quickly gives
way to the terror of the situation; in the third phase, following the crime,
the victim reportedly has "circular bouts of apathy, anger, resignation,
irritability, 'constipated' rage, insomnia, startle reactions, and replay of
the traumatic events through dreams, fantasies and nightmares. ' 51 The
repetition of abuse, Ewing explains, exacerbates the victimization of bat-
tered women since they repeatedly suffer the symptoms of Symonds'
third phase. The resulting psychological injury contributes to the bat-
tered woman's "ontological insecurity" and her fear of the "breakup of
the self" (p. 72).
Finally, Ewing turns to the field of psychopathology for the observa-
tion that severe and repeated batterings often lead to extreme depression,
and, in some cases, suicidal tendencies (pp. 66-70).52 Research has con-
sistently demonstrated a relationship between depression and suicidal in-
tent.53 This fact, together with the teachings of existential psychology,
victimology and the psychology of terrorism convey a dire message: The
constant threat of abuse, and the repeated realization of that threat,
cause "most battered women [to] eventually 'experience a turning point
when the violence or abuse done to them comes to be felt as a basic
threat, whether to their physical or social self, or both'" (pp. 64-65).54
At this "turning point," faced with the "disintegration" of her "self,"
the battered woman must make a choice; if leaving the relationship is not
possible, and often it is not, the woman can either kill herself or kill her
49. H. KOHUT, supra note 48, at 103.
50. Symonds, Victim Responses to Terror, in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY
129 (F. Wright, C. Bahn & R. Reiber eds. 1980).
51. Id.
52. Walker expresses basically the same proposition with her use of the theory of learned
helplessness. In fact, the connection between helplessness and depression has long been noted.
Professor Seligman, the first to empirically study learned helplessness, observed that "the de-
pressed patient believes or has learned that he cannot control those elements of his life that
relieve suffering, bring gratification, or provide nurture-in short, he believes that he is help-
less." M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEATH 93
(1975).
53. Hankoff, Suicide and Attempted Suicide, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE DISORDERS
416 (E.S. Paykel ed. 1982).
54. Johnson & Ferraro, The Victimized Self The Case of the Battered Woman, in THE
EXISTENTIAL SELF IN SOCIETY 118 (J. Kotarba & A. Fontana eds., 1984).
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abuser. Under these circumstances, Ewing asserts, "their homicidal acts
are clearly instances of self-defense" (p. 76).
If one accepts the belief that domestic abuse threatens the abused
with a psychological state equal to death, the step to sanctioning a de-
fense of the "psychological self" is a small one indeed. Psychological
death being equal to physical death, the threat of either justifies defensive
action. But Ewing argues that even if psychological death only approxi-
mates actual death, which of course it must, most jurisdictions allow
deadly force to be used in contexts where no truly deadly threat is pres-
ent, but other essentially psychological interests, are threatened. Most
jurisdictions, for example, allow the use of deadly force to avoid kidnap-
ping or rape, and in many jurisdictions deadly force may be used to repel
unlawful intruders from entering one's home (pp. 80-83). Although kid-
napping, rape, and defense of one's "castle" all involve physical threats,
the bodily threat in these examples does not alone justify the use of force.
Also at stake in these examples are such psychological interests as bodily
integrity, autonomy, and the "feeling of security" in one's home. Simi-
larly, although a physical threat obviously exists for battered women,
Ewing finds the greater threat in the devastating psychological fate re-
sulting from repeated, although not necessarily deadly, abuse (p. 76).
Ewing convincingly demonstrates that his theory of psychological
self-defense is essentially consistent with the basic policies underlying the
existing doctrine. 5" Yet, those not agreeing with his premise regarding
the clinical dangers of violent relationships, and few should, are prone to
overlook the value of his book. This is unfortunate, since it contains an
important lesson. As presently stated, however, couched solely in terms
of a woman's right to defend her psychological integrity, Ewing loses the
inherent force of his argument. The power of his argument comes from
the common-sense premise that a person subjected to repeated physical
abuse, from which escape is impossible and help from others unavailable,
may be justified in resorting to self-help. Existing self-defense doctrine is
insufficient simply because it does not accord with common sense. Ew-
ing's remedy fails due to his abandonment of the common sense he used
to reveal the flaws in the existing doctrine, and, moreover, in his adop-
55. The paradigmatic case of self-defense would be the defendant who, having retreated
until her back was against the wall, killed her attacker while fending off a deadly blow. See 2
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 126, at 131-32 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1979) (the wall is "reached
in a figurative sense when further retreat would increase the danger to defendant's life"). Ew-
ing employs the "retreat to the wall" metaphor to explain the battered woman's plight:
The batterer has, in effect, pushed the woman's "back to the wall." Unable to escape
the battering relationship, her options are extremely limited: she can kill herself, kill
the batterer, or resign herself to a fate sometimes not much better than physical
death. Under such extreme circumstances-which admittedly do not occur in every
battering relationship-the "instinct of self- preservation" leaves the battered woman
with little in the way of true choice
(p. 80).
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tion of clinical legerdemain in its stead. After discarding the rigid and
ritualistic original doctrine and dismissing its most heralded substitute,
Ewing disappointingly embraces just another formalistic ritual.
IV. Applying Clinical Patches to the Doctrine of Self-Defense
Throughout my reading of Ewing's book, two related questions re-
peatedly occurred to me: First, what is the scientific basis for his propo-
sal?; and second, what are the reasons behind applying a purportedly
sophisticated clinical solution to the problem of women's self-defense?
As for the first question, I do not doubt Ewing's sincerity in forwarding a
psycho-solution to an area of the law obviously in need of creative sug-
gestions. The psychological concepts he embraces, however, are far from
the mainstream of either clinical or research circles of psychology, 56 and,
I assume, will have even less acceptance in the legal circles to which they
are aimed. But if his psychological theorizations are not compelling,
what lies behind the perceived need to construct an elaborate theory to
defend battered women when they claim simply that their actions were
justified? The need for a complex theory of the "psychological self" is
not altogether obvious if the basis for the battered woman's defense is
that she acted reasonably under the circumstances. In this section, I
briefly explore the scientific basis for the present proposal, leaving deeper
analysis to future writers. The elaborateness of Ewing's suggested re-
form, however, raises intriguing questions regarding the defense of bat-
tered women who kill, as well as the doctrine of self-defense in general.
A. Lack of a Scientific Basis for the "Self"
Ewing is the first commentator to conceptually link the psychoana-
lytic view of "self," and more particularly the notion of "psychological
injury," to battered women defendants.5 7 Although standing alone in
56. The existential psychology of Laing, and Kohut's view of the self, stem from the
psychodynamic theories of Sigmund Freud. To say this, however, perhaps overstates the
weight these ideas carry in psychology today, since to some extent most of modem psychology
owes an intellectual debt to Freud. In the twentieth century, psychology has fractured into
many camps, all of which can be generally characterized as either research-based or analytical,
with Kohut and Laing falling somewhere amongst the hundreds of theorists in the latter cate-
gory. Kohut and Laing would be rejected out of hand by research psychologists because they
make no attempt to validate their theories experimentally. As for the analytical camp, it is
impossible to gauge the number of adherents these theorists enjoy. Neither "ontological inse-
curity" nor "disintegration anxiety," however, are included in the DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTI-
CAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) (DSM III), which is the American
Psychiatric Association's official taxonomy of mental illnesses.
57. In the book, Ewing discusses the observations of Professors Johnson and Ferraro who
describe what they call the battered woman's "victimized self":
The victimized self is a complex mixture of feelings and thoughts based on the indi-
vidual's overriding feeling of having been violated, exploited, or wronged by another
person or persons. It develops when an individual feels a fundamental threat to his
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accepting the validity of this observation, he suggests that expert testi-
mony should be admitted to help the fact finder understand the psycho-
logical threat confronting the battered woman. Assuming experts can be
found willing to testify to this idea (probably a safe assumption) Ewing
nowhere explains what form this testimony should take. Nor, remarka-
bly, does he mention either the Frye test,58 or the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence,59 as possible bars to the admissibility of this evidence. This
omission is troubling, since no scientific data exist to support his clinical
premise of "ontological insecurity" or, more importantly, any relation-
ship between "ontological insecurity" and physical abuse.
Ewing asserts that the expert testimony forwarded under his propo-
sal is at least as valid as that now accepted in cases involving such issues
as insanity and diminished capacity (p. 94). This argument hardly
sounds a ringing endorsement, nor is it particularly accurate. While psy-
chological diagnoses used to determine "sanity" have a checkered his-
tory,60 for the most part they at least are "generally accepted" by a
significant segment of the clinical community. Ewing has not demon-
strated that ontological insecurity or the "disintegration of the self" are
generally recognized diagnoses that support a claim of psychological in-
firmity. Even if so recognized, however, Ewing does not use them in this
way. He contends that the threat of these infirmities justifies the use of
deadly force. The expert would not be expected to testify that the bat-
tered woman defendant suffered from a psychological injury, only that
or her very being or existence. The actions or situations people interpret as funda-
mental threats are varied. Some women feel deeply threatened by verbal assualts,
while others may come close to death regularly without feeling themselves to be
victims.
Johnson & Ferraro, supra note 54. Ewing both deepens this concept, by attaching it to the
theories of Laing and Kohut, and extends it, by arguing that a woman may be justified in
killing in order to avoid threatened psychological despair (pp. 64-65).
58. In the seminal case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained the "general acceptance" test as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific princi-
ple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
Id. at 1014.
59. See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
60. See Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and The Un-
conscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971, 1055-56 (1982); Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427,
452-55 (1980).
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she could have, or did, reasonably fear such injury prior to killing the
batterer. Without some scientific basis for believing that physical abuse
causes severe psychological disability, expert testimony cannot assist the
trier of fact to understand more than the obvious: Psychological injury
accompanies physical abuse. Whether such "psychological injury" justi-
fies homicide in a particular case is an altogether different question that
cannot be answered by expert testimony.
B. The "Need" for Psychological Theories
The very creation of the concept of psychological self-defense, an
overly complicated and sure to be controversial theory, raises the ques-
tion of what lies behind the perceived need for such an endeavor in the
first place. The answer may be gleaned by considering the unusual popu-
larity of the scientifically flawed, albeit sophisticatedly packaged, theory
of battered woman syndrome.61 Courts have moved quickly to admit
syndrome theory in cases where battered women are homicide defend-
ants to assist jurors in understanding what they routinely are called upon
to determine in other cases without expert help: the reasonableness of
the defendant's actions. Experts also testify to facts that ordinarily are
inadmissible in self-defense cases.62 The reason behind this ready ac-
ceptance, beyond the strong feelings these cases engender, appears to be
the fact that courts recognize that the doctrine of self-defense applies
imperfectly to battered women defendants. By admitting expert testi-
mony on the battered woman syndrome, however, the law of self-defense
need not change. With a clinical solution to the problem of battered
women defendants, the law itself remains unchallenged. The "liberaliza-
tion" of self-defense doctrine can thus be cabined to particular, very sym-
pathetic situations by allowing expert testimony to effectively nullify the
harshness of the traditional doctrine.
But Ewing sweeps more broadly than simply creating an exemption
for battered women under the existing doctrine; he tries to redefine en-
tirely the parameters for the justifiable use of physical force to defend
one's "self." Nonetheless, by arguing psychological self-defense Ewing
sidesteps a frontal assault on existing doctrine almost as nimbly as syn-
drome theorists. Implicit in many battered women cases, though few
writers in this area confront the issue, is whether abuse that does not
61. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
62. Compare State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 202, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (1984) (expert could
testify to the battered woman syndrome and the defendant's history of abuse in order to aid the
jury "in determining whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have be-
lieved there was imminent danger to her life") with State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 16, 247 A.2d 669,
672 (1968) ("j]ustification for a killing in self-defense... depends on the jury's determination
of what they think a reasonable man would have done under the circumstances. This objective
test, rather than a subjective exploration of [the defendant's] psyche has been the standard for
justifiable homicide consistently applied in this state.").
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threaten "serious bodily harm or death" can ever justify the use of deadly
force. In the vast majority of reported cases, battered women kill under
circumstances where the deadly threat is not readily apparent, or where
it appears that she killed not out of fear for her life, but to stop the con-
stant abuse. Thus, the battered woman's lethal response appears unrea-
sonable on its face because it is disproportionate to the immediate harm.
The radicalness of Ewing's book comes from the suggestion that killings
under these circumstances may still be justified. 63 Unfortunately, by in-
voking this psychoanalytic artifice, Ewing obfuscates the terms of the
debate.
Although the patterns of familial violence vary considerably and in
many ways cannot be fully appreciated from outside the relationship, the
crucial issue whether the defendant's lethal action was reasonable should
turn on basic notions of justice. As Professor Greenawalt noted suc-
cinctly, "justified action is morally proper action." 64 But by adopting the
expression "extremely serious psychological injury," Ewing converts bat-
tered women defendants' conduct into an abstraction: They kill to avoid
the "breakup of the self" or out of a fear of a "regression to psychosis."
The widely varying circumstances of battering relationships do not obvi-
ously conform to such simple description, however, and Ewing cites ab-
solutely no data to support his observation. Consequently, Ewing fails to
identify for the reader the parameters of the suggested defense. We do
not know, for example, whether all battered women are threatened with
psychological injury or none are. Furthermore, since Ewing conducted
no field research, we do not even know whether battered women who kill
would cite a fear of psychological harm as a factor in the homicide.
Ewing's principal criticism of the battered woman syndrome is that
it fails to explain "the reasonableness of the woman's homicidal act" (p.
55).65 Ewing purports to surmount this difficulty with his explanation
that a battered woman defends against the threatened psychological in-
jury. Granting for the moment that some battered women face a "turn-
ing point" when they decide to avert psychological death and kill their
batterers, how does a jury or psychiatrist determine that this point was
reached in a particular case? Significantly, although Ewing summarizes
scores of battered women defendant cases, he does not apply his proposal
to particular situations to show how it might apply in some cases but not
in others. He makes no attempt whatsoever to provide specific criteria to
enable a fact-finder to discern when one battered woman kills justly and
another kills unjustly.
63. In a classic understatement, Ewing notes that "this theory of psychological self-de-
fense may seem rather abstract, overly speculative, and perhaps even radical, particularly to
those accustomed to thinking of self-defense in traditional legal terms" (pp. 62-63).
64. Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 1903.
65. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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The one hundred cases Ewing describes illustrate starkly that do-
mestic violence assumes many forms; and as Ewing acknowledges, not all
of them should be terminated with the death of the batterer. The diffi-
culty of these cases lies in identifying what combined sets of circum-
stances justify a woman's decision to respond to abuse with deadly force.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical defendant who claims that her hus-
band got drunk every Friday night after work and that he invariably
came home afterwards and beat her. This pattern continued for some
time, and although she had tried to obtain help from police and friends,
all efforts had proved unavailing. Recently, her husband's drinking had
intensified, and the violence increased until one Friday night she was
beaten quite severely. The following Friday, her husband walked
through the door drunk, and before he said or did anything she shot and
killed him. Under classical legal doctrine, this action would not be con-
sidered self-defense, though most people would probably agree that she
acted reasonably, and in "self-defense."
The pattern of violence in this hypothetical is readily apparent, ren-
dering her prediction of harm seemingly sound. The threat of harm in
this case was, for all intents and purposes, "imminent," and in all likeli-
hood serious and potentially fatal. But what if she had used the same
"defensive" force on Thursday, when her husband came home sober? Or
what if she had not been "severely" beaten the previous Friday night (or
ever) and did not fear serious bodily harm or death, but lashed back with
deadly force because of the constant physical abuse and her fear that it
would continue? Because the circumstances of battered women cases
vary so widely, static clinical generalizations fail to capture the essence of
the battered woman defendant's "decision" to kill. In assessing blame-
worthiness, traditional questions of imminence and proportionality re-
main important, but the overriding question of reasonableness must
depend on the entirety of the woman's situation and whether her action
was a necessary response to the abuse.
The challenge for battered women defendants and their advocates
lies in explaining the actual reasonableness of the particular conduct in
question; and the challenge for courts lies in understanding the battered
woman's plight within a societal context in which her options may be
few. As in the hypothetical above, the use of deadly force, although
departing from traditional notions of self-defense, in some cases may be
readily understood as justified. Where the pattern of violence is unam-
biguous, and the woman's unique position in the relationship allows her
to recognize and predict her tormentor's violence, the justness of her de-
fensive action is obvious. Other fact patterns present more difficult ques-
tions, however, and in some cases the battered woman may have been
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only partially justified in using deadly force.66 In still other cases the
defendant may have acted unreasonably under the circumstances, or for
a motive other than self-defense.
Pigeonholing battered women cases into "syndromes" and "psycho-
logical harms" belies the complexity and difficulty of discerning justice
when battered women kill. A wide variety of circumstances contribute to
lethal responses to abuse, and clinical descriptions operate to mask the
difficult variability of these cases. In fact, these clinical approaches,
while effective in the short term, may themselves impede substantial pro-
gress for women and the law. Although both Walker's battered woman
syndrome and Ewing's psychological self-defense purport to portray bat-
tered women as justified in killing, they frame their arguments in psycho-
logical terms that convey just the opposite impression. A battered
woman's claim that she was justified in killing depends simply (and, at
the same time, complexly) on the viability of the claim itself.
The problem of battered women who kill challenges the very foun-
dation of existing self-defense doctrine. In particular, the existing doc-
trine's myopic vision of the justifiable use of force-a vision informed
exclusively by male stereotypes of reasonableness-must be reexamined.
While imminence and proportionality should remain important factors
in assessing the justified use of force, they cannot alone constitute the
complete inquiry into the justness of the battered woman defendant's ac-
tion. A flexible application of the traditional doctrine is needed in order
to allow the fact-finder to understand the exigent circumstances that
force some battered women to kill. For this solution to work, the trier of
fact must be permitted to understand the reasons why the perception of
imminent harm and the range of reasonable proportionate responses
might be different for women than for men. In most cases, the battered
woman defendant's introduction into evidence of her particular exper-
iences and social reality will enable the fact-finder to determine the rea-
sonableness of her conduct. In some cases, however, fact-finders may not
be able to understand fully the forces that culminated in a particular
battered woman defendant's killing. In particular, juries may not fully
appreciate why the woman did not simply leave the violence. In those
cases where reliable social science research can assist the trier on this
issue and other similar issues, it should certainly be admitted.
67
66. See generally, Note, Imperfect Self-Defense, supra note 1, at 623 (analyzing the diffi-
culty of fulfilling the proportionality requirement when a battered wife shoots her husband).
67. Research findings could be communicated to the jury either through the traditional
avenue of expert testimony or through the trial court's instructions to the jury. See Walker &
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 592-
98 (1987) (advocating briefing trial courts on social science research, and then having courts
communicate reliable research findings to juries).
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Conclusion
Professor Ewing adds a novel view to the exceedingly complex and
emotionally charged questions associated with battered women who kill.
His notion of psychological self-defense challenges the reader to rethink
traditional notions of both "self" and "defense." By interpreting
through a psychoanalytic looking glass what it means to defend the self,
Ewing argues that the term should encompass more than just physical
well-being. Thus Ewing redefines the doctrine's classical requirement
that a defendant who claims self-defense have responded proportionally
and only to an imminent harm. Unfortunately, the psychological con-
cepts advanced in the book cloud the real terms of the debate. The subti-
tle of the book is "Psychological Self-Defense as Legal Justification."
Ewing expends too great an effort expounding the battered woman's
"psychological self," and too little time explaining the justness of her
action.
Nonetheless, the value of Ewing's book should not be understated,
for it forces us to expand our idea of the defense of the self, as well as our
understanding of the complexity and severity of the battered woman's
situation. Battered women defendants present the courts, and indeed all
of society, with an inordinately complex problem that, at best, traditional
self-defense doctrine handles imperfectly. Ewing's book, though it fails in
its aim to reformulate self-defense doctrine, puts forward many impor-
tant questions and provides significant insights into the condition of bat-
tered women. Moreover, Ewing's basic message is sound: When
battered women kill and claim self-defense, fact-finders must be allowed
to consider all of the relevant circumstances predating the killing. This
evidence is needed, however, not so that the jury can consider whether
the battered woman feared the "disintegration of the self," but simply to
determine whether she acted reasonably under the circumstances.
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